Analysis of strategic behaviour using non-cooperative game theory. Topics include extensive-form and strategic-form representation of games, and solution concepts for games of complete and incomplete information such as Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Economic applications will be presented. Prerequisite(s): ECON 2020 and ECON 2030 each with a grade of C+ or higher or ECON 2002 (no longer offered) and ECON 2003 (no longer offered) each with a grade of C+ or higher; ECON 2400 (or MATH 2000 or MATH 2004) with a grade of C+ or higher; and ECON 2202 (or equivalent, or STAT 2605 or STAT 3502), which may be taken concurrently with ECON 4025.Lectures three hours a week.
